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Agency-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
W. Harold Bigham*
I. EMPLOYEE AND INDEp NT CONTRACTOR DismcTiNsim
II. MISPRmESENTATIONS OF AGENT
I. EMPLOYEE AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DISTINGUISHED
During the abbreviated survey period there were no significant or
momentous decisions by Tennessee courts-state or federal-involving
agency principles. Indeed the only state appellate case properly to be
considered here involved the rather pedestrian question of whether a
petitioner for workmen's compensation benefits was, vis-a-vis the de-
fendant prime contractor, an employee or an independent contractor.
The applicable provisions of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation
Law' impose liability where there is an "employer-employee" relationship.
"Independent contractors" are therefore not within the ambit of coverage
under the act.2 In Smart v. Embry3 an injured workman sought com-
pensation from a prime contractor who denied that the petitioner was an
employee and contended to the contrary that the injured workman was an
independent contractor. The only problem for the court was which of the
contentions was correct in view of the facts, which may be briefly sum-
marized as follows.
The S. & S. Construction Company built houses, but, although it pro-
vided the materials, all the labor was subcontracted to various individuals.
Embry was one of S. & S. Company's subcontractors and was responsible
for the framing of several houses. He in turn engaged the petitioner to do
the cornicing work, and paid petitioner a lump sum per house, adjusted for
variation in size of house. Petitioner worked "by the job" and furnished
his own employees. S. & S. inspected petitioner's work almost daily
to insure that it met plans and specifications; under its contract with
petitioner, however, it did not have any right to control, nor did it attempt
to control, the manner in which petitioner actually performed the work.
While engaged in the performance of the cornicing contract, the petitioner
was injured.
* Associate, Phillips, Gullett & Steele, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-902 (Supp. 1961).
2. Clendening v. London Assur. Co., 206 Tenn. 601, 336 S.W.2d 535 (1960);
Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43 (1956). This is the general rule.
See 27 AM. Jur. Independent Contractors § 3 (1940).
3. 348 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1961).
The supreme court in an opinion by Justice Felts affirmed the chancel-
lor's decree which had denied the petitioner compensation on the ground
that he was not an employee, but an independent contractor.
The decision is a sound one. It is apparent from an examination of the
cases involving the independent contractor relationship that there is-
in the words of Justice Felts-"no one infallible test" 4 for determining
whether one is an independent contractor or an employee, and that each
case must be determined on its own facts; nevertheless, there are many
well-recognized and fairly typical indicia of the status of an independent
contractor.5 Among these indicia are the rights to direct what shall be
done, and when and how it shall be done, even though subject to the
right of the owner or primary contractor to approve or disapprove the
finished product.6 Other commonly recognized tests, although not neces-
sarily concurrent or each in itself controlling, are the existence of a contract
for the performance of a certain piece of work at a fixed price, the in-
dependent nature of the business or calling, obligation to furnish necessary
tools, and method of payment, whether by time or job.7 The petitioner
here met all these additional tests as well as the prime test of "control,"
and was without doubt an independent contractor.
II. MISME~nESENTATIONS OF AGENT
Butts v. Colonial Refrigerated Transportation, Inc.8 is merely another ex-
ample of the Sixth Circuit's unfortunate proclivity for writing per curiam
affirmances. It is well-nigh impossible to determine whether the liability
of the defendant which the court affirmed sounded in tort for deceit or was
based on breach of contract. In any case the liability resulted from certain
false statements made by the defendant's authorized agent, the plaintiffs
having relied on the statements to their detriment 9
4. 348 S.W.2d at 324.
5. See, e.g., Seals v. Zollo, 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41 (1959); Bond Bros., Inc.
v. Spence, 198 Tenn. 316, 279 S.W.2d 509 (1955); REsTATEmENT (SEcoND), AGENCY
§ 220 (1958).
6. Frost v. Blue Bidge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 S.W.2d 860 (1928);
Odom v. Sanford & Treadway, 156 Tenn. 202, 299 S.W. 1045 (1927); Powell v.
Virginia Constr. Co., 88 Tenn. 692, 13 S.W. 691 (1890). See also 27 Amr. Jur.
Independent Contractors § 6 (1940); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 725 (1931).
7. 27 Am. Jun. Independent Contractors § 5 (1940).
8. 290 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1961).
9. Apparently the agent in this case was authorized to make the false statements.
Quaere: Why should not the master be liable for contracts entered into by an agent
attempting to "be about his master's business," even though not specifically authorized
by the master? For an interesting argument that the master should be liable for agency
contracts on the same terms as he is now liable for agency torts, see Mearns, Vicarious
Liability for Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REv. 50 (1962).
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